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THE KEYNESIAN VISION  
Never Again  
When Keynes set to work in 1940/41, at the time of a desperate fight for survival 
of democracy, to draft the documents which would become basic inputs to the 
Bretton Woods Conference held in 1944, his objectives can best be understood as 
negative - in the sense of negating the experience of the Great Depression of the 
1930s. The overarching principle was: 'Never again!' - never again anything like 
the 1930s. Then there was heavy unemployment - so the new objective must be 
full employment as a top priority (and Keynes had shown in 1936 in his famous 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money what the instruments of a 
full employment strategy should be). In the 1930s there had been a breakdown of 
internationally agreed trade and investment rules - so the new objective was to 
prevent beggar-my-neighbour policies and manage the world economy according 
to agreed rules. The 1930s had seen first futile attempts to maintain the gold 
standard, then its collapse and competitive currency devaluations - so the new 
objective was to have stable currencies with agreed adjustment procedures. The 
1930s had been a period of deflation - so the new objective was expansionary 
macro-economic policies. The 1930s had seen a collapse in commodity prices - 
the new objective was to stabilise and maintain commodity prices. The 1930s had been a period of rising protectionism, and narrowly national scrambles to achieve 
self-sufficiency and balance of payments surpluses - so the new objective was to 
move towards liberal and agreed rules for expanding world trade and to support 
countries in balance of payments deficit. Above all, the 1930s had seen the 
withering away of the League of Nations - so the need was to build a new and 
stronger United Nations to provide the political and social security indispensable 
for an expanding world economy.  
All these objectives were interrelated in Keynes' coherent vision of a better and 
sustainable world system. For example, the provision of adequate liquidity and 
the discouragement of trade surpluses also served the objective of full 
employment: a country in balance of trade deficit helps to produce the public 
good of full employment since it creates excess demand for goods from the rest of 
the world. By the same token, the surplus country is the enemy of the world 
economy in that its failure to import sufficiently reduces employment in the rest 
of the world; hence, the importance of proper liquidity in the world system and an 
appropriate recycling of surpluses.  
However, of all these objectives that of full employment was the top priority. An 
expanding economy with full employment of productive resources, especially 
human resources, would be the rising tide which would 'lift all boats'. 
Anticipating some of the following discussion, we may at this point reflect that 
the objective of full employment has certainly a more human face and a more 
direct relation to human security than control of inflation which was to take its 
place as a top priority in later years. This connection was clearly in the minds of 
the founders of the United Nations: the US Secretary of State, in his Report to the 
President on the 1945 San Francisco Conference stated: 'No provisions that can be 
written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure 
from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs.'  
Keynes was deeply influenced by the Beveridge Report which was published in 
the same year, 1942, as his own 'Memoranda' crystallizing his thinking and basic 
proposals for Bretton Woods. The Beveridge Report embodied the objective of a 
social welfare state on a national basis (for the UK), but the principle of social 
security, with safety nets, protection of vulnerable groups on and income transfers 
to the poor, was readily transferable to an international dimension. Keynes had 
collaborated in the preparation of the Beveridge Report and was an enthusiastic 
supporter.  
Thus the key elements of the Keynesian vision were: global macro-economic 
management by established and agreed institutions with growth, full employment 
and avoidance of deflation as top priorities; prevention of beggar-my-neighbour 
policies and encouragement of international co-operation to the common 
advantage; achievement of greater equality, social security and protection of 
vulnerable groups, both within countries and internationally across countries.  It is a matter of historical significance that the new post-war international order 
was established not as a unified process but in two separate steps. The first step 
was the creation of the Bretton Woods system, with the Bretton Woods 
Conference of 1944 as its landmark. The second step, a year or so later, was the 
creation of the United Nations, with the 1945 San Francisco Conference as the 
landmark. Both the fact that the two systems were created by separate processes, 
and also the fact that the Bretton Woods system preceded the UN system, are 
important and created a number of subsequent problems. 1  
The Bretton Woods Tripod  
Taking the Bretton Woods system first, the structure envisioned was that of a 
tripod resting on three legs. In 1942, still at a critical stage in the war, Keynes had 
produced three famous memoranda respectively on an International Clearing 
Union, an International Investment Fund and on International Buffer Stocks for 
Commodities. These three sets of proposals ultimately crystallised in three 
institutions: the IMF, the IBRD or World Bank and GATT (replacing the stillborn 
ITO). However, in this process of institutionalisation the original proposals were 
heavily watered down and in some respects distorted.  
(a) The IMF  
The IMF was initially envisaged by Keynes as a world central bank, issuing its 
own reserve currency, or 'bancors'. (The World Bank was envisaged as an 
investment fund - hence the statement that the Fund should have been a bank and 
the Bank should have been a fund.) It was to be a powerful institution with 
resources equal to one half of world imports - under present circumstances this 
would have meant a Fund of $2 trillion (2 million million dollars!). The Fund was 
supposed to put strong adjustment pressures on the surplus countries which 
threatened the rest of the world with deflation and unemployment and shift 
general liquidity to the deficit countries which helped to maintain full 
employment and expansion in the rest of the world. For this purpose Keynes 
proposed penal action against surplus countries in the form of a tax (negative rate 
of interest) of 1% a month on outstanding trade surpluses. One need only list 
these elements of the original vision to see to what extent reality has diverged 
from it. Some of these divergences, e.g. the failure to create sufficient liquidity in 
the form of SDRs or the asymmetrical pressure on deficit countries rather than on 
surplus countries are now the starting point of reform proposals. Above all, the 
objective of fixed exchange rates which was at the heart of the original proposals 
was abandoned in 1971 and we now have a regime of effectively floating 
exchange rates and widespread currency instability.  
In the process of shifting the weight of its pressures to the poorer deficit countries 
depending on its support, the IMF also became an influence in the direction of 
monetarist, deflationary and restrictive policies with control of inflation, 
expansion of exports and debt servicing as primary objectives, rather than the full employment maintenance of import capacity and avoidance of debt burdens in the 
original vision.  
(b) The World Bank  
The investment fund - which became the World Bank - was supposed to do the 
major recycling of capital from capital-surplus countries to poorer capital-deficit 
countries. This was based on the optimistic assumption that the marginal 
efficiency of capital in capital-scarce countries must be very high compared with 
the capital-rich countries; hence there would be a large reservoir of highly 
profitable projects in what we now call the developing countries and a natural 
incentive for capital to flow in their direction. It was only a question of 
identifying and designing these projects and creating the institutional framework 
for organising the flow by borrowing in the rich countries and lending to the poor. 
Repayment would be assured by the high profitability of the projects. This would 
be sufficient to reduce poverty and implement the international aspect of the 
Beveridge concept of social security.  
The role of the World Bank was to be clearly distinct from that of the IMF. The 
IMF was a monetary institution with an emphasis on short-term equilibrium, the 
demand side of the economy, and programme lending; by contrast the World 
Bank was to be a development institution with emphasis on the long-term, the 
supply side of the economy, and project lending. While this distinction seemed 
clear-cut in the initial conception, subsequent developments have eroded it. In the 
case of the World Bank, the limitation to project lending proved to be difficult to 
reconcile with its envisioned big role in development. This was partly because of 
the labour-intensive and time-intensive process of identifying, designing, 
implementing and monitoring of projects, and partly because it became 
increasingly clear that the success of projects depended not so much on the 
quality of the project as on the economic policy environment in which the project 
had to operate (which was supposed to be the sphere of operations of the IMF). 
Moreover, contrary to the initial optimistic assumptions, it turned out that in the 
poorer countries there were not sufficient projects which were profitable at non-
concessional rates of interest and generated resources sufficient to service the 
loans. Hence the World Bank (like the IMF) was driven towards offering 
concessional facilities and beginning to operate as an aid organisation.  
As a result of having to deal with the debt crisis and other harmful external 
impacts on developing countries during the 'lost decade', the World Bank in its 
structural adjustment programmes was also moving from long-term lending to 
medium-term lending, while the Fund with its own structural facilities was 
moving from short-term lending to medium-term lending. Thus there was an 
increasing `grey area' of medium-term policy-based programme lending in which 
the division of functions between the Bank and the Fund was far from clear.  The debt crisis and its move into structural adjustment lending also meant that the 
Bank (as well as the Fund) took on the role of debt custodian. The original 
intention, by contrast, had been that the Bank (and Fund) should be the custodians 
of an international order in which the debt crisis would not have arisen in the first 
place.  
(c) The ITO/GATT  
The third leg of the tripod of the Bretton Woods system was supposed to be the 
International Trade Organisation. Although this was not negotiated at Bretton 
Woods but three years later at Havana (1947-48), its establishment was already 
confidently anticipated at Bretton Woods and the Terms of Agreement of the IMF 
and World Bank were drafted on this assumption. In Keynes's vision, the ITO was 
an essential part of the Bretton Woods system. Among its essential features was 
included the negotiation of commodity agreements - Keynes for many years had 
been a strong believer in the need for stabilisation of commodity prices. As 
negotiated in Havana, the charter of the ITO included chapters on: Purposes and 
Objectives, Employment and Economic Activity, Economic Development and 
Reconstruction, Commercial Policy, Restrictive Business Practices, 
Intergovernmental Commodity Agreements, Institutional Aspects of an ITO, the 
Settlement of Differences and General Provisions. The far-reaching scope of the 
ITO - much beyond the scope of the present GATT - will be evident from this list. 
Apart from commodity agreements, it included employment, restrictive business 
practices, economic development, and it also provided for a close relationship 
with the United Nations (which by that time had been established). Among its 
purposes was also 'to encourage the international flow of capital for productive 
investment' and improvement of labour standards where the ITO was expected to 
work closely with the ILO. In commodity agreements, the ITO was to secure 
'such prices as are fair to consumer and provide a reasonable return to producers'. 
It is clear that the ITO, if established, would have been a very powerful 
organisation, even overshadowing the IMF and World Bank.  
In the event, the ITO was never established. It lapsed in 1951 when it became 
clear to the US administration that the US Congress would not ratify the Charter 
as negotiated in Havana. Here is a clear gap in the system as envisaged at Bretton 
Woods. By the time that it was clear that there would be no ITO Keynes was 
dead. He had left Bretton Woods - like everybody else - in the firm belief that the 
ITO would be established. It is an open question whether he would have been 
satisfied with the outcome of Bretton Woods if he had known that there would be 
no ITO.  
Pending the ratification of the ITO, in 1947 a `Protocol of Provisional 
Application' was adopted - the present General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). This provisional arrangement has now lasted for 46 years - rien ne dure 
que le provisoir! GATT clearly covers only a part of the functions of the ITO. 
Moreover it is not an institution like the IMF or World Bank defining and implementing precise norms, but it is in the nature of a negotiating or consulting 
mechanism engaging in a number of 'rounds' of negotiations aiming at trade 
liberalisation. There is however a proposal now on the table in the Draft Final Act 
of the current Uruguay Round to establish a full organisation (a Multilateral Trade 
Organisation or MTO). This proposal, like the Uruguay Round itself, is however 
still in the balance at the time of writing. Even if the MTO is successfully 
established, it would have much narrower functions than the ITO. Moreover, in a 
significant shift illustrating the difference between 1947 and 1993, the MTO 
would not be linked with the UN as the ITO was supposed to be but with the 
Bank and the Fund.  
Apart from filling part of the gap created by the non-ratification of the ITO with 
GATT, in 1964 UNCTAD was established which also took up some of the ideas 
behind the original ITO Charter, i.e. in its integrated programme for commodities. 
But UNCTAD remained a forum for discussion and formulation of new ideas. It 
remained an integral part of the UN and was not a separate institution. The 
present situation can only be understood against the background of history, with 
the rest of the ITO agenda - insofar as it did not go to GATT - scattered over the 
rest of the UN system. The subsequent discussion of restructuring the system will 
have to concentrate on GATT and the proposed MTO.  
(d) The United Nations: Global Governance  
The ITO is not the only gap compared with the original vision. Although at the 
time of Bretton Woods the United Nations did not yet formally exist, it was 
already on the horizon and it was clearly envisioned as being the locus of global 
macroeconomic governance. The need for such a locus was inherent in the 'never 
again' approach to avoid the unemployment and other disasters of the 1930s. The 
UN was considered the obvious place for global governance because avoidance of 
the events of the 1930s was seen by everybody concerned at the time as crucial 
for the maintenance of peace and avoidance of war. The organs for global 
economic governance were defined the year after Bretton Woods - in 1945 - when 
the UN Charter was agreed as being the UN General Assembly and the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC). The UN was also to be equipped with a fund for 
aid to developing countries - a little later the Marshall Plan served as a precedent.  
In the event, this did not materialise for reasons discussed in the section on The 
Bretton Woods Institutions and the UN. The UN was limited to technical 
assistance and food aid, while multilateral financial aid was allocated to the 
World Bank (and to a minor extent the IMF). The function of global governance 
went partly to the Bretton Woods institutions and partly outside the UN system 
altogether to the G-5 or G-7 and the OECD. Thus the Bretton Woods system - 
apart from being incomplete due to the lack of the ITO - also in the event lacked 
the envisioned essential fourth leg of global governance in the UN. In addition to 
being incomplete, the system also operated in a way quite unforeseen in the 
original vision and in some ways heavily distorted away from it. Today we are seeing a need to restructure the system. The original vision is still valid in 
indicating to us directions which restructuring should take.  
Did the Keynesian Vision have a Human Face?  
The answer to this question - comparing the Keynesian vision with the present 
reality - is yes and no. Let us take the 'yes' first.  
As emphasised in the preceding part of this paper, the guiding star of the 
Keynesian vision was: 'Never again!', i.e. by all means avoid the miseries of the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. These miseries were not only economic but 
human miseries, in the form of heavy unemployment, social insecurity, starvation 
wages and a heavy incidence of poverty. Avoiding a repetition of this traumatic 
experience was therefore conceived as a humanitarian as much as an economic 
necessity.  
The establishment of full employment - abolition of unemployment except for an 
inevitable minimum - as a dominant objective was in itself a human and social 
orientation, relating to job security as well as participation and avoidance of social 
marginalisation. The objective of full employment is certainly more closely 
directed towards human resource-oriented development than the objective of 
control of inflation and avoiding balance-of-payments deficits which has 
presently largely replaced it.  
The expansion of productive employment which was the main Keynesian 
objective is today recognised as one of the three core themes of the World Social 
Summit, in addition to poverty reduction and enhancement of social integration. 
Full employment is also closely interrelated with these other two objectives. The 
unemployed and their families are being integrated into the social fabric. 
Moreover, as the 25 years of full employment Keynesianism 1946-1971 have 
demonstrated, full employment makes foreign immigrants welcome as an 
essential addition to the labour force and prevents the rise of xenophobia and 
racialism. With full employment, the new immigrants are quickly integrated into 
the economic and social life. In more recent years, with the abandonment of full 
employment strategies, we have seen all this happening in reverse.  
The link of full employment with poverty reduction is equally clear: the 
unemployed will normally be among the poorest families and their poverty is 
alleviated by obtaining employment. There may be a certain reduction in real 
wage rates for those already in previous employment, but if this occurs it would 
be amply compensated by increased opportunities for upgrading, promotion and 
overtime earnings. Moreover, government revenue would be increased by high 
taxable profits and incomes from employment which would help to support social 
services and the financing of social safety nets. All in all, although full 
employment would bring cross-currents of redistribution among as well as 
between social groups, it is a positive sum-game. With proper social arrangements the losers could be compensated leaving the rest better off than before. The high 
rate of investment and pressure on available resources would also stimulate 
technological innovation and thus contribute to higher future growth rates.  
Keynes was also deeply involved with the Beveridge Report of Social Security 
For All, establishing the framework of a Social Welfare State, which appeared in 
1942, the same year as Keynes's three original memoranda for the Bretton Woods 
triad of IMF/WB/ITO. While the Beveridge Report was not formally part of the 
Bretton Woods agenda, Keynes was an enthusiastic supporter, having closely 
collaborated with Beveridge in its formulation. Thus the idea of a social safety net 
with universal coverage and protection for the most vulnerable groups - the 
young, the old, the ill and all other groups outside the labour market as well as the 
chronically unemployed - was fully embraced by Keynes. It is true that this was 
on a national basis, more directly for the UK. It is also true that Keynes's initial 
interest in development problems was weak - too weak to embrace the idea of an 
international welfare state. But he held that the principles of the Beveridge Report 
were moral principles which should apply even - or perhaps especially - in the 
reduced economic circumstances of the UK during and immediately after the war.  
In his essay: 'The Economics of our Grandchildren' Keynes had approached the 
idea of an international welfare state indirectly and implicitly, but nonetheless 
unmistakeably. He argued there that as the richer countries became richer and 
richer, very little value would be attached to further wealth accumulation; instead, 
additional resources provided by technical progress would be devoted to charity 
as well as increased leisure-time spent on cultivating the arts. Although he did not 
mention this explicitly he would readily have agreed that while the charity he had 
in mind might begin at home it need not and should not end at home.  
It was well-known to Keynes and his circle that the Western concept of 
unemployment, based on full-time public sector jobs, would not be directly 
applicable without modification to, for example, rural people in marginal 
environments or more generally to developing countries with large informal 
sectors. Indeed, conditions resembling the informal sector of developing countries 
were recognised to exist even in advanced industrial countries and were covered 
by the concept of 'hidden unemployment' (developed by Joan Robinson) or 
'underemployment'. In the 1970s it became the standard view that the real 
problem of developing countries was poverty rather than unemployment. This 
was particularly strongly argued by the ILO Employment Mission to Kenya2 
which established the concepts of the informal sector and of the 'working poor'. 
Since then, there has been a synthesis of the specifications of poverty and 
unemployment respectively as the chief problem, embodied in the policy 
objective of increasing 'productive employment'. In this qualified form, 
employment has been re-established as a key objective, with the further proviso 
that it has to be supplemented by social safety nets for groups not capable of 
employment. The qualified objective of productive employment makes the human-oriented character of the objective even more explicit by linking it with 
the objectives of poverty reduction and increase in human welfare. 3  
Having said all this, in support of the thesis that the Keynesian vision of an 
expanding full employment world economy was essentially human-centred, we 
now enter into a more doubtful area. In the first place, it is certainly true that 
Keynes and the Keynesian consensus treated unemployment more as an economic 
waste and economic folly than as an offence against human-centred development. 
He used the language of a professional economist, not of a social reformer. The 
latter role he left to his involvement in the Beveridge Report and to his more 
peripheral writings. However, since the economic waste and the human waste of 
unemployment coincide, perhaps not too much need be made of this particular 
distinction.  
More serious is another divergence of the Keynesian vision from our present 
emphasis on human-centred development. The Keynesian vision of full 
employment growth was in terms of full-time paid jobs, leaving little room for 
preferred part-time employment ("disguised unemployment"), flexible 
employment arrangements, working from home nor indeed was women's work at 
home or in raising children recognised as productive employment. In all these 
respects, the Keynesian approach is at odds with current emphasis on flexible 
labour markets and, in particular, the notion that only paid work has value.  
Thirdly, the Keynesian picture of full employment neglected the rural-urban 
relationship crucial in developing countries. If employment in the urban/formal 
sector increases, there is intensified migration from the low-income rural areas. If 
the income gap between rural and urban incomes is high, it becomes rational for 
rural workers to run the risk of unemployment in the town for the sake of a chance 
of a well-paid urban job. Thus for every new job created in the urban sector, there 
may be several new migrants and unemployment may actually increase (Harris-
Todaro model). Thus a full employment policy may have to be concentrated on 
rural employment opportunities and the reduction of the rural-urban income gap.  
The main instrument in the Keynesian system for achieving and maintaining full 
employment was demand management by active macroeconomic government 
intervention; and the main objective of this active government intervention was 
the maintenance of a high level of investment, both private and public. This is 
most clearly expressed in the Harrod-Domar formula which links the Keynesian 
system with development economics, by defining the conditions for sustained and 
sustainable full-employment growth. The H-D formula analyses this growth as a 
function of the rate of investment (or saving) divided by the capital/output ratio. 
Thus stated, this is a simple tautology - telling us that if the rate of investment is 
for example 15 per cent and the capital/output ratio is 3:1 (indicating an efficiency 
of investment of 33.3 per cent), then the rate of growth will be 5 per cent. In this 
formulation, the approach could appear mechanistic and abstract, since the 
'investment' is clearly perceived as physical investment, in terms of 'bricks and mortar'. There is no indication here of the concept of human investment or human 
capital formation which today is universally accepted as an important element in 
total investment.  
The H-D formula can easily be interpreted - or misinterpreted - as a form of 
'capital fundamentalism'. 4 When linked with models like that of Arthur Lewis 
embodying the concept of surplus labour, it easily leads to the notion that capital 
is the only scarce factor and sets the limit to development. Even when 'human 
capital' is added it may lead to a limited view of human capital, limited that is to 
what promotes the more efficient use of the ultimately decisive factor of physical 
capital. In education, this could lead to stress on high-level skills needed to 
operate modern technology, with insufficient concern for the primary and 
secondary educational infrastructure. Even though this would not have reflected 
the views of Keynes or H-D, it is undeniable that it influenced development 
practitioners of 'capital fundamentalism' during the period of the Keynesian 
consensus.  
Capital fundamentalism or investment fundamentalism had implications for 
income distribution not conducive to a 'human face', once a state of full 
employment was approached. If the key to growth lies in investment, savings 
must be increased. This puts a premium on shifting income to richer groups with a 
higher capacity and propensity to save. (Indeed, the fashionable Kuznets curve 
indicated that this was a normal process in the earlier stages of development). 
This view not only run counter to objectives of poverty reduction, it specifically 
neglected the importance of asset acquisition by poorer people as a means of 
increasing economic (and human) security.  
However, there are two qualifying factors which make the H-D formula approach 
appear more human and less mechanistic that it might appear at first sight.  
(a) The all-important capital/output ratio in the denominator of the simple H-D 
equation measures the efficiency or rate of return of investment. It is perfectly 
compatible with the Keynesian system to argue that the capital/output ratio is 
partly, mainly, or almost wholly determined by labour productivity which in turn 
is the result of human investment in health, education, training, etc. It is perhaps a 
pity that these factors were not specifically identified but instead tucked away in 
the denominator under such a neutral term as 'capital/output ratio'. 5 But at least a 
proper interpretation of the H-D formula shows that the human factor has not 
been eliminated from the picture.  
(b) The H-D formula identified per capita growth rather than aggregate growth as 
the objective; hence the rate of population growth was introduced as a negative 
factor, deducted from the rate of investment (or saving) divided by the 
capital/output ratio. 6 The population factor clearly introduces an element of 
human development. The H-D formula opens up the possibility that the desired 
objective of higher per capita growth can be achieved by slowing down the rate of population growth. This is particularly relevant for developing countries and 
forms an integral part of a human-centred view of development. The consensus 
today is that human investment particularly improved literacy and education for 
women, can be an important factor in reducing the rate of population growth.  
(c) Within the context of keynesian full-employment macroeconomics, 
investment (or saving) is achieved, not by cutting consumption - which would 
reduce human welfare and could reduce human capital formation - but by 
increasing total resource utilization. Investment and consumption increase 
together, by way of increases in total income. It is only when the condition of full 
employment and full resource utilisation is reached that choices between 
investment or consumption have to be made.  
Summing up, we can say that the Keynesian growth system, while it certainly was 
mechanistic, and did not explicitly mention the human driving forces, yet it is 
capable of incorporating the present view of human-centred development without 
forcing us to abandon the system. There are however new elements other than 
people and population which are missing from the Keynesian vision. Social 
integration may perhaps be considered as at least partially taken into account 
through full employment. However such elements as the environment, the role of 
women, and the question of human rights, which now form an integral of our 
concept of development, were clearly not represented in the Keynesian vision (nor 
in the neo-liberal counter-vision which displaced the Keynesian consensus in 
more recent years). Thus we may say that the Keynesian vision is still valid, with 
the addition of some new issues such as the ones just mentioned.  
1. See the subsequent section on 'The Bretton Woods System and the UN System'  
2 . Employment, Incomes and Equality in Kenya - a strategy for increasing productive 
employment in Kenya, International Labour Ofice, Geneva, 1972. The reference to 'productive 
employment' in the sub-title already foreshadowed the 'synthesis' mentioned in the text.  
3. There is a parallel between the qualification of the full employment objective as 'productive 
employment' and the qualification of the growth objective as 'labour-intensive growth' or an 
'appropriate pattern of growth'. In the qualified forms of 'productive employment' and 'labour-
intensive growth', the growth and employment objectives clearly come close together.  
4. Yotopoulos and Nugent: Economics of Development - Empirical Investigations, Harper and 
Row, New York, 1976, p12.  
5. The 'residual factor' of increasing total factor productivity (TFP) through technical progress 
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